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              Daniel Byman, professor at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Saban Center 
for Middle East Policy, has written a monumental book depicting Israel’s long fight against 
terrorism, from the years preceding the state’s creation in 1948 till today.  The book is divided into 
five substantive sections. The first one deals with the pre-Oslo period. It opens on the formative 
years, which were marked by repeated and often bloody attacks that targeted the "infiltrators". Then 
it turns to the years between the Six-Days War and 1970, the year the PLO was expelled from 
Jordan, leading the group to install itself in Lebanon and form the Black September Organization, 
responsible for numerous attacks including the 1972 hostage-taking at the Munich Olympic Games. 
The author goes on to discuss the 1982 "Peace for Galilee” Operation, launched to put an end to the 
PLO's claim over the West Bank, and to help the Maronites, led by Bachir Gemayel, attain the 
presidency. Until Israel withdrew the Tzahal forces from Southern Lebanon in 2000, the operation 
resulted in several disastrous and well known failures - the loss of Christian allies, the emergence of 
Hizballah, the deaths of hundreds of soldiers and the subsequent condemnation by the international 
community.  
             The second section focuses on the period between the Oslo Accords, signed on the White 
House lawn in 1993 by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, and the controversial Operation Cast 
Lead, a three-week armed conflict launched in the Gaza strip in 2008, which set off waves of 
international condemnation.  The third one analyzes the enduring conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah. Tackling the issue of qualifying Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist organizations, Byman 
takes care to define the notion of terrorism, making the distinction between attacks against civilians 
and attacks against military targets, excluding the latter from the category of “terrorism”.   
               A fourth section is devoted to “Jewish terrorism”, inflicted against both Palestinians and 
Israelis accused of being traitors to the cause of “Greater Israel”, of which Rabin would later 
become one of the most illustrious victims.  The fifth and final section juxtaposes several issues: the 
effects of targeted killings, of the security barrier erected by Israel and the “dilemmas” faced by its 
leaders. The author explores to what extent the lessons from this conflict are transferable to other 
democracies, and outlines the major political errors made by Israel. 
               From this impressive amount of information the author draws several compelling 
conclusions. Israel’s fight against terrorism has been neither a complete success nor a total failure; 
Byman’s picture of the conflict is depicted more in shades of grey than black and white.  On the 
positive side of the balance he puts the successes of the Israeli secret services that foiled multiple 
attacks, arrested numerous perpetrators, and thus prevented countless Israeli deaths. Targeted 
killings proved effective, the separation barrier complicated terrorist efforts, and despite its “harsh 
interrogation practices” Israel has, in his eyes, managed to reconcile counter-terrorism with respect 
for human rights over the last two decades.  Moreover, the Israeli population has shown 
extraordinary resilience in its capacity to lead a normal daily life despite wave after wave of suicide 
attacks.  
               On the negative side, he points to the deliberate ignorance of Israelis regarding the 
political consequences of this struggle, specifically, the fact that it led to the radicalisation of 
warfare and the creation of groups such as Hezbollah.  The dissuasion strategy has not always been 
very successful. While many armed extremist groups now hesitate to provoke Israel, retaliatory 
measures are harder to launch because of the vigilance of the media. The search for a political 
solution to this conflict has been greatly complicated by Israel’s decision to erect the security 
barrier. Last, insufficient attention has been paid to Jewish terrorism and there is a double standard 
in the Israeli response, Palestinian terrorists being punished more severely than their Jewish 
counterparts. The author concludes with recommendations encouraging Israel to find a political 
solution to the conflict. 
From an academic perspective, this book is an outstanding achievement in pedagogical 
clarity and wealth of data. It does not limit itself to the analysis of Israel’s counter-terrorism policy, 
it also provides useful insights into the motivations of Palestinian armed groups. It draws on 
numerous interviews that reflect both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives. However, the book gives 
rise to a number of reservations. It lacks a theoretical framework, and yet, the notion of 
“asymmetrical warfare” at the core of the study could have provided one.  The author strives to 
balance the positive and the negative aspects, but falls short of offering a hierarchy in his 
conclusions, or any strong ideas regarding this “Shadow War ”. The book also lacks a comparative 
perspective between Israel and other countries, like Great Britain or France, who have had to deal in 
the past with the same type of asymmetrical conflict.   
Moreover, the “success” of targeted killings must be qualified. Byman writes: “Israel has 
successfully used targeted killings to disrupt terrorist groups, reducing their effectiveness and 
forcing their leaders underground”.  But history has shown that this modus operandi was at times 
effective, at others counterproductive, and the question is, under what conditions can it prove the 
most dissuasive against terrorist attacks.  The January 2002 assassination of Raed Karmi, one of the 
leaders of the Tanzim, occurred despite the cease-fire Israelis and Palestinians had just reached, and 
pushed Fatah to resort to suicide attacks beyond the green line. This explains the dramatic increase 
of suicide bombings starting in 2002.  The incident, mentioned in the book, should have brought the 
author to a more nuanced global conclusion. 
Overall, this book is an unquestionable success, well-nuanced, and displaying a great 
intellectual honesty.  That is why, paradoxically, it is unlikely that it will please the Israeli public, 
who, in general, is more inclined to accept the explanations given by its leaders than to dwell on the 
nuanced, serious and sophisticated analysis written by an academic.  
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